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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
• In the short term, Vietnam may benefit from the US-China trade war through replacing 
Vietnam’s Chinese exports of good to the US market and the relocation of China-based 
manufacturers to Vietnam. 
 
• The Vietnamese government's strategy to address these external trade tensions is to 
enhance macro-economic stability, mitigate exchange rate volatility, and participate in 
trade agreements to maintain export growth. 
 
• However, in the long term, the US-China trade war presents challenges to Vietnam's 
export-led and foreign investment-led growth model. 
 
• Vietnam needs to adopt economic policies to achieve a truly market-based economy 
and improve public investment to maintain and enhance the growth momentum. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The IMF’s World Economic Outlook published in October 2018 names trade tensions as one 
of the greatest risks to global economic growth1. The US-China trade war is at the centre of 
global trade tensions, and although some analysts suggest that Vietnam is one of the ‘winners’ 
in the US-China trade war2, a report by FT Confidential Research argues that the country is in 
fact one of the most vulnerable countries due to its dependence on exports3. Furthermore, 
achieving a sizeable trade surplus with the US would lead to Vietnam being put on the watch 
list of US trade policy makers4. 
 
This article analyzes both the positive and negative effects of the US-China trade war on 
Vietnam. It will also discuss the Vietnamese government’s strategies in dealing with the 
situation, and conclude with some important points that Vietnam needs to pay more attention 
to when coping with the war. 
 
 
IMPACT OF US-CHINA TRADE WAR ON VIETNAM 
 
We believe that US-China trade war brings both challenges and opportunities for Vietnam. In 
the short term, Vietnam may benefit from trade tensions between the US and China through 
the temporary boost in exports and foreign investment. 
 
At the recent conference—“Impact of US-China Trade War on Ho Chi Minh City’s 
Economy”—, Dr. Vo Tri Thanh said that when imports from China to the US became more 
expensive due to higher tariffs, US companies would look for import alternatives from other 
countries, such as textiles, garments and electronics from Vietnam.  
 
According to the General Statistics Office (GSO), Vietnam's exports to the US reached nearly 
$35 billion in September 2018, up by 12.5 percent from last year. In particular, exports of 
mobile phones and accessories increased by 46% while exports of textiles, leather, and 
footwear increase by more than 12 percent5. 
  
Vietnam can also benefit from a global supply chain transformation as businesses move a 
significant part of their production out of China. In recent years, multinational companies had 
already been shifting high-margin industrial operations to Vietnam due to rising costs and risks 
of doing business in China. The US-China trade war accelerates the trend. The advantages of 
the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA), 12 established free trade agreements 
(FTAs) and important agreements awaiting for ratification such as the EU-Vietnam FTA and 
the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) make 
Vietnam attractive to multinational companies after the trade tensions escalate6, and major 
global manufacturers such as Intel, Foxconn, LG and Samsung are already relocating their 
factories to Vietnam. 
 
At the same time, Chinese companies are also transferring production orders of goods affected 
by higher tariffs to partners in Vietnam. Some Chinese producers may increase investment in 
Vietnam or cooperate with companies in Vietnam to fulfill orders for their partners in the US 
market. Anna Ho, the CEO of Silstar Machinery, a supplier of machinery for plastic packaging 
manufacturers, told The Saigon Times Online that in the past few months she had been 
welcoming many plastic packaging manufacturers from China as well as buyers from the US 
who were interested Vietnamese enterprises producing this item7. 
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The trade war has, however, also created many challenges for Vietnam. The first is that 
Vietnam may soon be subjected to higher tariffs being imposed by the US government due to 
the practice of Chinese-owned factories rerouting their Chinese-made products to Vietnam and 
labelling them as “made in Vietnam” products8.  
 
For example, Do Duy Thai, Chairman of Viet Steel Corporation, is worried that cheap Chinese 
steel is being disguised as Vietnam’s products and then re-exported to the US9. The same holds 
for the Vietnam Leather, Footwear and Handbag Association, which has expressed concern 
about Chinese companies bringing in their finished goods to Vietnam through cooperation and 
joint-ventures with Vietnamese enterprises and then re-exporting them as “made in Vietnam” 
products to the US10. Such practices may lead to Vietnam-made goods being hit by with higher 
US tariffs. Vietnam already had the sixth-highest trade surplus with the US in 2017, after 
China, Mexico, Germany, Canada and Japan; countries which are all under scrutiny by 
President Trump’s trade team11. The risk is therefore high that US policy makers will consider 
placing higher tariffs on imports from Vietnam. 
 
The relocation of Chinese-based production facilities to Vietnam, though providing short-term 
boosts to exports and foreign investment, also adds to the risks for Vietnam becoming a 
“pollution haven”. At the press conference on 28th September 2018, Nguyen Bich Lam, 
Director General of the General Statistics Office (GSO), explicitly expressed his concern that 
the “waves” of Chinese enterprises relocating to Vietnam could make the country a destination 
for outdated, pollution-generating, and small-scale industrial technologies coming from its 
giant neighbour12. 
 
Another risk to Vietnam is that US and Chinese consumer goods and agricultural products 
affected by the trade war will pour into Vietnam instead. One example is US pork. With China 
imposing an additional tariff of 25 percent, the tariff levied on US pork exported to China 
increases to 71 percent. At such a high rate, it is very difficult for US pork to gain market shares 
in China, and Vietnam becomes an attractive alternative for these products. As it is, the price 
of pork in Vietnam is at around 48,000 to 50,000 VND per kg, one of the highest in the world, 
while the cost of US pork imported to Vietnam is just over $1.5 per kg, equivalent to only about 
35,000 VND per kg. The latter would thus enjoy a great comparative advantage on the Vietnam 
domestic market. Nguyen Van Ngoc, Vice Chairman of the Animal Livestock Association in 
the Southeast region, has said that US meat imported into Vietnam increased by as much as 
nearly 50 percent in the first half of 2018.13. 
 
Similar scenarios can happen with other Chinese and US agricultural products. Currently China 
is the big market for agricultural products such as fruits, rice and seafood from Vietnam. 
Chinese vegetables and fruits, abundant in supply and relatively cheap, put a lot of pressure on 
Vietnam’s agricultural products being sold in both China and the domestic market of Vietnam. 
In addition, US fruit exporters may also focus more on Vietnam once their products are hit by 
higher Chinese tariffs. 
 
In the longer term, the biggest negative consequence of the trade war, in our opinion, is the 
slowdown of the global economy. Slower economic growth can force businesses to cut capital 
spending as monetary market conditions in the US and some developed countries tighten. Since 
Vietnam’s growth model relies heavily on exports and foreign investment, it is especially 
susceptible to a global economic slowdown and tighter financial conditions. 
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Table 1. Summary of negative and positive effects of US-China trade war on Vietnam 
 
Positive effect Negative effect 
• Increase in exports to the US to replace 
Chinese goods. 
 
• Increase in export orders of goods 
transferred from China. 
 
• Companies relocate Chinese-based high-
margin industrial operations to Vietnam. 
• Vietnam goods could suffer high US 
tariffs due to Chinese goods being 
rerouted through Vietnam before 
being exported to the US. 
 
• Chinese companies accelerate the 
process of transferring outdated and 
pollution-generating technologies to 
Vietnam.  
 
• Fierce competition from US and 
Chinese consumer goods and 
agricultural products on both 
Vietnam’s export and domestic 
market  
 
• Lower long-term economic growth  
-  
 
 
In short, we think that in the short term, the impact of the trade war on Vietnam will be more 
positive than negative, but in the long term, the potential damage caused by higher US tariffs, 
environmental problems and growth deceleration will outweigh short-term benefits. 
 
 
HOW DO VIETNAM’S POLICY MAKERS PERCEIVE THE TRADE WAR? 
 
Before the US-China trade war broke out, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc had in early 2018 
set as the principle for coping with as by being “firm in principles, flexible in strategy and 
tactics” (in Vietnamese “Dĩ bất biến ứng vạn biến”)14.  
 
After the trade war started, and the Chinese Yuan dropped in value, many Vietnamese 
economists urged the government to take appropriate actions quickly. One of the most 
controversial suggestions was for State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) to act proactively by devaluing 
the Vietnamese dong to increase the competitiveness of Vietnam’s exports. While experts and 
the public in general debated the proposal to devalue the Vietnamese dong (VND), the Prime 
Minister once again reaffirmed his principle of “firm in principles, flexible in strategy and 
tactics”. He insisted that there would be “no change in economic and financial policies in 2018, 
including the petrol tax”, adding that “We do not act based on guesses about the international 
financial market as many people have recommended before there is evidence of clear impacts”. 
He also emphasized the need to stabilize the fluctuations of the USD/VND exchange rate 
within a range of 2 percent compared to the rate at the end of 2017.15  
 
This approach is consistent with some suggestions that have been put forward in China on how 
China is to cope with the trade war. Shen Jianguang, an economist at Mizuho Securities Asia, 
stated that while the Chinese government should not panic, it should not underestimate the 
impact of the approaching trade tensions. China should also consider the US-China trade war 
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as a driving force for accelerating economic reforms, thus converting external pressure into an 
internal force to push China towards a “second accession to the WTO”. This could be 
interpreted as a “firm in principles, flexible in strategy and tactics” approach16. This remark 
coincides with the recent report in the South China Morning Post that Chinese leaders are 
considering joining the CPTPP as a part of the strategy to cope with the trade war. 
 
Appearing recently on Bloomberg, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc said that it was 
important for Vietnam to maintain macroeconomic stability and export growth and to stabilize 
the living standards of the 96 million people in the country. The Prime Minister has consistently 
remarked on Vietnam being “self-reliant” when facing global challenges and will seek more 
trade co-operations with countries outside of the 12 FTAs Vietnam has already signed. "We 
have to rely on internal strength to overcome all obstacles and maintain the momentum of 
growth," Mr. Phuc emphasized17. 
 
Through the Prime Minister's remarks on Bloomberg, it can be discerned that the Vietnamese 
government's core strategy to cope with the trade war is to promote macro stability, stabilize 
the value of the dong, and pursue more trade agreements to increase exports and maintain 
growth momentum.  
 
Although economic reform was briefly mentioned, it was not central to the Prime Minister’s 
messages. This is cause for worry that Vietnamese leaders may not be paying enough attention 
to domestic economic reforms in their strategy. In other words, the trade war may actually 
distract these leaders from moving further towards a market economy, and may see them 
focusing too much only on tactical solutions to maintain macro stability and increasing exports 
in the short term and neglecting radical economic reform as a means to revitalize long-term 
growth.  
 
Some other recent developments suggest that this is a legitimate concern. The state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) equitization process, one of the three major pillars of economic 
restructuring, has slowed down significantly. According to the government’s plan for 2018, 85 
SOEs should be equitized this year. However, as of July 2018, only 19 of them had been 
equitized. What is even more worrying is that despite the plan to equitize 39 SOEs in Ho Chi 
Minh City and 11 in Hanoi, leaders of these two major economic centres have so far equitized 
none18.  
 
 
HOW CAN VIETNAM RESPOND TO THE UNCERTAINTY? 
 
Short-term tactical responses 
 
In the short term, to limit the practice of rerouting and disguising Chinese goods as Vietnamese 
products, the Vietnamese central and local governments should adopt a more selective policy 
in attracting FDI. The local governments should closely scrutinize and reject investment 
projects that show signs of rerouting and disguising practices. However, we are worried that 
these suggestions cannot be effectively enforced due to legal barriers and the short-term 
thinking of local officials. Furthermore, Hanoi may not want to be criticized by Beijing 
forspecifically targeting Chinese investors.  
 
At the same time, Vietnam can and should act more decisively against pollution-intensive 
investments through more stringent environmental requirements and enforcements. This is an 
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urgent issue that the government should not neglect—the negative impacts on citizens’ health 
can be serious and can worsen Vietnamese citizens’ negative attitudes towards Chinese 
investors.  
 
To help domestic producers compete with Chinese and US’s exports of food and agricultural 
goods, the Vietnamese government needs to be more proactive in helping domestic companies, 
especially SMEs, to access capital and promote Vietnamese high-quality brands. Stringent food 
safety requirements and promotion of safe and high-quality agricultural products can be 
effective solutions in this endeavour.    
 
Strategic response 1: Moving towards a truly market economy 
 
In order to lessen the risk that Vietnam goods could suffer high US tariffs due to Chinese goods 
being rerouted through Vietnam to the US, Vietnam has to move towards a true market 
economy. 
 
Having managed Canada and Mexico, the United States is now moving towards trade and 
investment deals with EU and Japanese partners with the “poison pill” provision against “non-
market” countries19. Meanwhile, it is being remarked that Vietnam is a "New China"20 or a 
“mini China”21. The Vietnam’s government should be aware of the risks associated with being 
classified as a non-market economy and should prepare appropriate solutions to address these 
risks. 
 
So far, we have not seen much evidence of the domestic media and economic experts in 
Vietnam paying proper attention to this situation. If the trade war spreads, it is likely that 
Vietnam will encounter new problems arising from being branded as a “new China” or “mini 
China”. Although Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) documents do indicate that Vietnam 
always pursues a socialist-oriented market economy, Vietnam has been recognized as a market 
economy by 69 countries, including important trading partners such as ASEAN countries, EU 
countries, Australia, India, Japan and New Zealand. However, the US still thinks that Vietnam 
is a non-market economy22.  
 
If Vietnam does not speed up the negotiating process to be recognized by the US government 
as a market economy, it is likely that Vietnam will face a lot of difficulties when the “poison 
pill” provision is triggered and applied to non-market economies like Vietnam. This is a risk 
that Vietnam cannot underestimate. 
 
Vietnam seems to be moving in the right direction to meet the market economy criteria under 
Article 19 U.S.C. 1677 of the United States by aiming to completely abolish subsidies on 
electricity, petroleum and medical services. Meanwhile, many experts still keep to the line that 
currency devaluation is the most effective weapon for increasing Vietnam's competitiveness. 
This is usually an attractive option given the myopia of strategic planning in Vietnam, partly 
due to the association of strategic planning timelines to the tenure of CPV and government 
leaders. 
 
The negative side of the devaluation policy or the lack of transparency of the exchange rate 
regime may see Vietnam being classified as a non-market economy, and even a currency 
manipulator by the US. Therefore, in our opinion, the exchange rate policy needs to be more 
flexible and transparent for Vietnam to avoid being listed by the US government among 
countries that manipulate their currencies. To identify whether the exchange rate is market-
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oriented as the SBV claims, our study suggests that Vietnam needs to have a mechanism to 
control the “power on exchange rate”23. 
 
The long-term benefit of being a true market economy for Vietnam is not just about being 
officially recognized by the United States as a market economy to avoid the effect of the so-
called “poison pill” provision. The most important benefit of being a true market economy for 
Vietnam is to help current and future leaders remove self-imposed barriers to sustainable 
growth.  
 
One of the self-imposed barriers is the emphasis of the current economic model on state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), most of which have the lowest productivity in the economy. Moving 
towards a true market economy will require the government to stop subsidizing the 
underperforming SOEs, which will allow more efficient allocations of resources in the 
economy.    
 
 
Strategic response 2: More efficient public investment to promote sustainable growth  
 
Trade tension is one of the reasons that lead to IMF’s decision to lower its global economic 
growth forecasts for 2018 and 2019. The growth of five ASEAN countries, including Vietnam, 
is expected to be at only 5.3% this year and 5.2% next year. We believe the impact of trade 
tension on long-term growth is a major risk to Vietnam. Therefore, a radical solution to cope 
with a long-lasting trade war for the government nees to undertake serious reforms. 
 
For a developing economy that relies heavily on exports and foreign investment like Vietnam, 
the ability of government in implementing fiscal policies to support economic growth is 
essential. Deputy Prime Minister Vuong Dinh Hue has pointed out that the government has 
paradoxically failed to spend the planned budget on public investmen, and that that is one of 
the main reasons for the country not achieving the expected growth rate24. 
 
The problem of the unspent budgeted public investment is that "the Ministry of Finance is 
holding excessive funds while the economy is starved of capital." The excessive funds are 
financed by bonds issued by the Ministry of Finance or equitized SOEs. The Ministry of 
Finance is accumulating hundreds of trillions of dongs while several infrastructure projects are 
unable to access the approved funds25. 
 
An example for this situation is that even national key strategic projects such as the North-
South Express Highway project were delayed over the past three years for lack of funds, 
although the government had in fact allocated funds for this project. The reason is that the 
Ministry of Transport hah had to deal with 112 inspection and audit teams26. It was the 
disbursement procedures and the disruptions caused by these inspections that seriously delayed 
the projects and left domestic and foreign investors with a bad impression of such projects. 
 
These shortcomings are attributed to the new Public Investment Law passed by the National 
Assembly in 2015. Even this law helps to significantly reduce rampant and inefficient 
investment, it also inadvertently creates a new constraint on Vietnam's future economic growth. 
In a recent announcement, the government of Vietnam officially acknowledged this new 
bottleneck27. 
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The government of Vietnam intends to comprehensively revise the Public Investment Law and 
submit a new draft for consideration by the National Assembly by the end of this year. 
However, such a revision is not viewed favourably by the Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly. The Vice Chairman of the National Assembly has argued that a comprehensive 
revision is unnecessary, 28 while the Chairwoman of the National Assembly also affirmed that 
“In the next meeting of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, I will provide 
evidence that the bottlenecks are driven by problems in the implementation process of the 
Public Investment Law, not the law itself”29. 
 
The disagreement between the government and the National Assembly may represent the lack 
of consensus among Vietnamese leaders regarding the efficiency of public investment in the 
country. For example, while there is a shortage of funding for hospitals, schools and 
infrastructures, the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Council approved a plan to build a concert hall 
that costs 1.5 trillions of Vietnam dongs in Thu Thiem. This decision faced large public 
opposition and many see this spending as “a waste of money” and “a case of skewed priorities”. 
The city is after all facing urban flooding, traffic jams and overloaded public infrastructure on 
a daily basis30. 
 
These questionable decisions could be reasons for some members of the National Assembly 
and the public supporting controlling measures such as inspections and over-complicated 
disbursement procedure. However, these excessive controls may also prevent Vietnam from 
investing in crucial infrastructure and educational projects for long-term growth.  
 
To address this public investment bottleneck, we suggest that the Public Investment Law be 
revised to allow for much-needed public investment funds to be disbursed for strategic projects. 
This approach should also be complemented with a plan to use the unspent funds held by 
Ministry of Finance to stimulate the economy through tax reductions. These measures are 
complements rather than substitutes because many national strategic infrastructure projects still 
require public investment.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our analysis suggests that Vietnam’s socialist-oriented market economy, which has not yet 
been recognized by the US as a true market economy, is increasingly vulnerable to external 
shocks when trade tensions are high. The CPV leaders and the government seem to be relatively 
slow in removing growth barriers and have been distracted from economic reforms. In the 
longer term, this lack of decisiveness and commitment may result in Vietnam missing short-
term gains and suffering serious damage from negative external shocks caused by trade 
tensions. 
 
A comprehensive economic reform which aims at achieving a true market economy and 
making wiser public investments will enable Vietnam to absorb external shocks in the future. 
That is particularly important in the context of a long-lasting global trade tension. 
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